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PREFACE.
We desiredto treat the subject of Fixtures in New York,
exhaustively, but the unexpectedly limited time at our disposal
forced us to abandon that ambitious project. The matter,
therefore, set forth on pp.ll-et seq., is the resilt of inves-
tigations which were confined solely to cases wherein the an-
nexation was made by one having a permanent interest in the
freehold.
Nor have we concerned ourselves with the consideration
of the specific chattels which have been held to constitute a
part of the realty; but we have endeavored, rather, to present
compendiously the general state of the law, and to trace the
progress of the development of a standard test; with a state-
ment of what we conceive to be the present attitude of the
courts on the subject.
"Speak your latent conviction, and, it shall be the uni
versal sense," said a very wise philosopher, and if we have
been over bold in our commentaries let this fault find its ex-
planation, if not justification, in our entire sympathy with
that sentiment.
Craigielea, May 30, 1894.
1INTRODUCTORY AND HISTORICAL.
About the roots of that hoary maxim of antiquity "QuiC-
quid plantatur solo, solo cedit" there has spring up a verita-
ble wilderness of conflicting decisions made gloomy and noi-
some by a mischievous undergrowth of obiter dicta.
Replete with ambiguities and inconsistencies; beset at
every point with difficulties of construetion and the danger
of false conclusions; the path of the venturesome traveller
who has dared these depths, fairly bristles with obstacles,
which, if known to him at the outset, would have caused him to
pause in trembling dismay, hardy and strong and well equipped
for stern encounter though he might be.
The dark shadows of many years growth deny to him the
light of logic or equity, and each step reveals to him more
fully the fact, that the way mmst be long and tedious and bur&*
dened with the weight of many days of patient investigation
and faultless labor if he would clear a path which others may,
in safety, follow.
It is vaguely stated by the authiorities that the maxim,
sutpra, upon which is predicated the modern law of fixtures,
is "one of great antiquity;" and with this unsatisfactory
statement we must content ourselves as the books do not afford
us information as to the precise period when it was formulated.
2The theory, however, of which that maxim is the essence
seems first to find expression in Gaius, where we observe this
provision;
"Moreover, that which any person has built on our land,
even though he have built it for himself, becomes our property
by natural law, because that which is added to the surface,
attaches to the land." Bk. 2, Sec. 73.
This provision appears to have gained favor with the Ro-
mans)for it, with the two sections following, were incorporated
into the Justinian compilations almost verbatim. I. 2. 1. 29.
At all events, the maxim in question, and which we cons
ceive to have drawn its life from the above provision, became
in some manner engrafted upon the English law; and, being a
very fit concomitant of the Feudal system of land tenure, was
carefully retained as a most wholesome principle, and, until
the reign of Henry VII, was applied with all that unyielding
narrowness of construction of which the English judiciary were
masters.
The downfall of feudalism, however, caused many radical
changes in England, and the courts, despite the accredited
strictness of their adherence to precedent, were forced to
recognize in a measure the changed condition of affairs. For
3it soon became very evident that much land would lie waste and
many estates go to rain for lack of tenants, unless some step
were taken looking to their protection.
In deference, therefore, to this necessity, the courts
began a series of adjudications which relaxed the old rile to
a certain extent in favor of tenants; they were permitted to
remove certain species of chattels which they had erected at
their own expense. Chattels annexed by the tenant for the
purposes of trade or manufacture; implements used for agricul-
tural purposes and some articles used for domestic ornament
and convenience were admitted to the favor of the courts.
To the conditions under which these tentative efforts
at reform were made, may, it is submitted, be traced much of
the confusion which now exists in the law concerning fixtures.
The judiciary must have been swayed by three distinct
influences; first, as men, they must have felt moved, by the
spirit of improvement which was springing up vigorously all
about them, to mitigate the rigorous rules of law which thenm
obtained; but on the other hand, in their official capacity
they felt the restraining influience of the established prece-
dents; while lastly, it became early apparent that they must
change the rule as to tenants as a matter of national expedien ,
4In consequence of this triangular battle which we think
it fair to assume must have waged in the juad.icial mind decisions
appeared whereby the necessary result was obtained, but at the
cost of being so hedged about with a multiplicity of reasons
and subtle distinctions, all looking to reconciliation
some impossible precedent, that subsequent courts find them"
selves at liberty to render decisions of almost any character
and at the same time find, in the earlier cases, ample author-
ity to sustain them.
It becomes still more apparent, that equitable impulse
little
played ' part in thus practically overturning precedent, when
we consider, that the comparc.tive liberality which marked the
adjudications of the courts when questions respecting the
right to chattels arose between landlord and tenant and co-
ordinate relations,--found no parallel in their attitude when
the litigants bore to each other a different relation.
And we apprehend, that when we began to accumulate pre-
cedents of our own, the rale of "Quicquid plantatur solo, solo
cedit" was applied with all its inherent inflexibility when the
annexation was made by one having a permanent interest in the
land. And, indeed, it has been said, that, "Notwithstanding
the great change which has taken place in the habits and opin-
5ions of society, this rule in favor of the freahold still 
re-
mains unaltered; and it muist be regarded as the general 
rule
of law at the present day."
Amos and Ferrard on Fixtures. p. XXIV.
DISCUSSION OF THE WORD "FIXTURE".
Even a cursory consideration of any portion of the sub-
ject of Fixtures wolld naturally seem to involve, primarily,
the careful inquiry as to the exact general definition of that
terrr; but here again we are met by difficilties of such a
character as to utterly defeat us in our quest; for we can
fasten upon no precise combination of words sanctioned by aus
thority, the applicetion of which, would in every instance,
determine the status, that is, the l status, of a specific
article which has been attached to realty.
A discussion in extenso and a comparison of the multi-
form definitions which disgrace the pages of writer and judge
alike, would be an undertaking of no small magnitude, and we
must, therefore, confine ourselves chiefly to a few commenta-
ries on the word itself as a scientific term.
It appears that the word "fixture" had originally no,
legal significance whatever, but was used in a popular sense,
merely to indicate the physical attacinent of a chattel to some
part of the realty. The men, h owever, who loved classifica-
tion and who longed to ad. something to the technical terminol-
ogy of the times, regarded this peaceful state of a7Vfairs with
great dissatisfaction, and finally plucked the word from its
7inglorious but harmless obscurity and swung it aloft as a
great acquisition to legal nomenclature; whence it has spread
the shadows of lamentable confusion over many generations of
sorrowing posterity.
Indeed, the result should have been anticipated for it
was wellnigh inevitable. Always difficilt as it is to reclaim
a word or phrase from poplfar usage, the task becomes still
more arduous I not quite inpossible, when it is sought to im-
pose 'upon such a word a duty entirely foreign to its etfrolog-
ical characteristics; and that such was the case with this,
word we have auJple aixthority. For example, Broom in his
Legal Maxims, p. 417, says; "In its correct sense the word in-
eludes sch things only of a personal nature as have been an-
nexed to the realty anti wnich may afterward be severed or re-
moved by the party who united them or his personal representa-
tives againat the will of t~ie freeholder. 
Out of this conception of the word very readily grew
the terms "irremovable' and "Removable" fixtures;-- the one
a e.nselestautologi and the other a hideous solecism, for the
perpetration of wihich there is no logical excuse whatsoever.
Tyler in his work on Fixtures says; "The word is of an
ambiguous meaning and the writers and courts have used it with
various signif'ioations ; but the word is always applied to
8chattels affixed to, or used permanently in connection with,
land". This statement is unquestionably true but seems to us
to offer but small matter for congratulation, since we unhes-
itatingly assert and endorse the very obvious truth, that the
use of" the word was and is entirely unneeessary, and that its
introduction into the category of legal terms is greatly to
be regretted. Let us sumppose, for example, that a mortgage
is foreclosed and a dispute arises as to whether or no a cer-e
tain engine shall be sold as part of the realty covered by the.
mortgage; the question really at issue is; Does this engine
bear such relations to, the freehold that it should be looked
upon as inseparable therefrom, or is it to be regarded as mere
pereonalty entirely without the scope of such mortgage? Now,
while the distinctive term "fixture" is ordinarily employed to
designate properly so circumstanced, it must be evident to any
one with a modicum of familiarity with law, that no specific
term is requisite here to aid the court in determining whether
the engine is to be considered realty or personalty. But
the courts ins4ist%- upon it, that, when personal property is 5
situated that for certain purposes and under certain circum-sh
stances, t ay lose its character as such and become realty,
a distinctive term is necessary to show that the article pos-
sesses, because of its peculiar situation, the capacity for
9being both realty and personalty.
The chief reason that so much difficulty has been exper-
ienc-ed by the courts in this country in handling the subject
of Fixtures lies in the fact that they insist upon having a
Law of Fixtures. There is no separate body of law which gov-
erns a class of property known as "fixtures"; the so called
"Law of Fixtures" is concerned entirely with a harassing and
never--answered interrogative; What constitutes a fixture?
If, to use Broom's definition, a piece of property, personal
in it nature, is a fixture,-then it is governed by the rules
applicable to personalty; but if, on the other hand, it be
hot a fixture, then its legal status is coordinate with that of"
the realty.
To be sure many attempts have been made to produce test;
which, as matter of law, woald be infallible; but the truth
of the matter lies in the simple statement; that there is not
and cannot be any such thing as the law of fixtures; because,
by reason of the peculiar nature of the subject it is not wit1h-64
in the possibilities of this, nor any other language, to formu-
late a rule, the application of which, will, in every concei -
able instance determine what is or is not to be regarded as
realty.
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DEFINITION OF "FIXTURE" IN NEW YOPK.
In this state the word fixture was used in the usual
ambiguous manner in the earlier cases, but of late it has been
uniformly employed in a sense which is in harLony with its ety-
mology. For example, in Hoyle V. Plattsburgh R. R. Co.
(51 Barb. 46) we find this expression; "And if without such
or similar articles the realty would cease to be of' value, then
they may properly be considered as fixtures and should pass
with it"; and again, in Potter v. Cromwell 40 N.Y. 292)
the following: ,"Under all the authorities, therefore, in this
state as elsewhere, this mill was a fixture and passes with
the land."
These and similar illustrations which might be adduced in
support of our position, warrant us, we think, in formulating
this definition of a fixture in this state: A fixture is an
article or~structure, originally personal in its nature, but
which stands in such relation toward the freehold, as to be.
come, in-conterriplation of law, an integral part of it; and
passing with it under a conveyance.
A discussion of the peculiar circumstancea which con-~
duce to effect this transmutation in the eye of the law will
occupy us presently.
ii
EFFECT OF 2 R. S., 82, SEC. 6, subd. 4.
Prior to 1830 it was conceded that questions arising
between heir and exec4uor, mortgagor and mortgagee, vendor and
vendee in respect to their rights in chattels, claimed to be a
part of the realty, were governed by precisely the same rules.
But in the Revised Statutes of that period there appeared a
provision which has been preserved verbatim in each succeeding
edition, and which merits some consideration.
The clause referred to was last year incorporated into
the Code of Civil Procedure (Sec. 2712 subd. 4) and reads as
follows: "Things annexed to the freehold, or to any building
for the purpose of trade or manfacture, and not fixed into
the wall of a house so as to be essential to its support--ashall
be deemed assets and go to the executor or administrator.
This statute came up for construction for the first time
in 1843, in House v. House (10 Paige 158) wherein Chancellor
Walworth rendered the opinion of the court. The object of the
statute was, plainly, to adopt the same rule between heir and
executor as prevailed between landlord and tenant; but the
Chancellor, while recognizing such intent on the part of the
legislature says;
"It was impossible, however, to define in a short sen-
12
tence of three lines what was to be considered a part of the
freehold itself, and what were mere fixtures or things annexed
to the freehold for the purposes of trade or manufacture. We
must, therefore, still go back to the conanon law and to the
decisions of the courts for the purpose of ascertaining what is
a substantial part of the freehold, and what is a mere fixture
or thing annexed."
The property in question consisted of water-=Iwheels,
millstones, running gear and bolting apparatus of a flouring
mill; and, consistently with his opinion, supra, he holds
them to be part of the realty, though they were annexations I
for the "purposes of trade and manufacture" and despite the fact
that they were not affixed to the wall of the mill so as to
be in any way "essential to its support."
This statute, which the court thus practically refuses
upon
to enforce, must be generally~lookedu, as inoperative, and the
decision, supra, as final and conclusive as between heir and
executor; for, curiously enough, no subsequent case nas been
discovered wherein this statute has been urged on behalf of
the executor. There have been several cases, however, wherein
the statute has been raised in the interest of a vendor or
mortgagor. In the case of Murdock v. Gifford (l} N,. Y. 281
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an effort was made in the interest of the mortgagor to have
the statute declared sufficiently elastic to embrace that anal-
ogous relatiot. Johnson Ch. J., ,however, decides the case,
on the principle involved in the old. case of Lawton v. Salmon
(1 Hem. Bi. 259. n.); But while thus tacitly ignoring the
statute so far as it might apply to the situation in hand, yet,
in referring to Chancellor WalwQrth.' remarks as to the im-
possibility of'giving effect to the statute, he delivers the
following dictum:
"These observations are certainly just; for it is
quite obvious that the statute does not mean that the executor
shall take everything not essential to the support of the
walls of a building but only such things are spoken of as are
not a constituent part of the freehold, or of the artificial
structure erected on the land.3
But in Ford v. Cobb (20 N. Y. 344) the next case in
which an attenipt was made to extend the scope of the sta-tute,
we find in the opinion of Denio J., this remrark: "The reason-
ing of the Chancellor in House v. House, ante, is not altogeth-
er satisfactory to my mind: but as the judgment in that case
may be said to have become a rule of property it shodldi not be
disturbed without the greatest consideration, and certainly not
in a case like the present, which mnay be satisfactorily dis-
14
Posed of on other grounds." But the facts in that case did
not permit of disposition "on otner grounds" linless the learned
judge intended to imply a refusal to extend theoperation of
the statute.
In the next case which was that of Voorhees v. McGinnis
(48 IT. Y. 278) the court boldly throws off the veil of uncer-
tainty and says: "Ti e effect of' this provision is discussed
by Chancellor Walworth in Hoase v. House 'i(ante)..__.
cannot, however, alter the law as to the relation of vendor and
vendee, whatever may be its effect as ,between heir and execu-
tor."
Thus, while it is not at all certain that the courts
would uphold Chancellor Walworth's ruling as to the statute if
the question again came directly before them,.--it may be re-
gardod as absolutely settled, that whatever construction may
in future be given to the statute it will not be extended to
include any other relation than that of heir and executor.
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EFFECT OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
The general proposition in respect to the rights of a
mortgagee, is; that he is entitled to have his lien respected
as to all that was realty when he accepted the security and
also as to all accessions thereto; but this proposition is
subject to qualification, and the qualifying element; lies in
conventions between the mortgagor and the vendor of pasonaljty
which is to be so annexed #o the freehold as to become,uner
ordinary rules of lawa part thereof and consequently subject
to a mortgage covering the realty. Such conventions, generally
take the form of chattel mortgages, and it may be here re-
marked that the purchaser of the realty, when the transaction
occurs after the execution of the chattel mortgage stands in
the same relati~vie position as a mortgagee of the realty, and
may therefore be considered at the same time.
In an action between a chattel mortgagee and a subse"
quent purchaser of the realty, salt kettles, set in stone
arches so that they could not be removed with tearing out cer-
tamn brick work, were held to retain their character as chat-.
tels (Ford v. Cobb, ante). This case seems to be authority
for the general proposition that a chattel mortgage given
16
prior to the execution of a mortgage or deed of the realty,
acts as a conservator of the personal character of the chat-
tels covered thereby, and the pirchaser or possible mortgagee
is pt upon his inquiry as to what he is to get for his pur-
chase noney or what security he is to obtain for his loan; for
it was intimated in a dictum that the annexation was stfficient
to cause the kettles to be declared fixtures had it not been
for the intervention of" the chattel mortgage.
But this very broad and uweeping proposition is also,
very properly, made the subject of qualification, as appears
in the caseybefore citedof Voorhees v. McGinnis. That case
would, at first blush, seem to be a tacit overruling of Ford
v. Cobb; but upon more careful reading and a comparison with
the later cases, we assame to say, that it merely modifies the
rule there laid down.
The property in dispute in Vorhees v. McGinnis consisted
of an engine and certain boilers; it was shown that there was
no defined mental intent to make the annexation permanent but
it was also true that the removal of the engine and boilers
could not be accomplished without serious damage to the free-.
hold. The court, per Hunt C., entirely ignored the case of
Ford v. Cobb and decided that the engine and boilers became a
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part of the realty despite the existence of the chattel mort-
gage; and the learned judge adduces a hypothetical case to
illustrate the danger to be feared from a contrary holding. He
says, in substance: If a mason puts brick into a house and is
paid in fUll and it then transpires that the maker of the brick
held a chattel mortgage thereon executed by the mason, it
would be manifestly unjust to allow the cnattel mortgagee to
remove the brick; he is put to his action against the party
who converted the brick into realty.
It will be observed that the hypothetical case presents
a situation where the removal of the fixtures would result in
more damage to the freehold than wo-ld such removal in the
case at bar; and we therefore construe it to be an exaggerat-
ed exhibition of the reasoning whereby the decision in that
case was reached. The peculiar nature, then, of this hypothet-
ical illustration; the fact that the case of Ford v. Cobb is
entirely ignored; and the further fact that both cases are
recognized in later adjudications with no hint that they are
considered as conflicting, lead us to the conclusion that a
chattel mortgage avails it holder 2 j when the exercise of
his rights under it will not seriously injure the freehold.
Indeed, the late case of Tyson v. Post (108 N. Y. 218) goes
18
still further and maintains that "by convention the owner of
the land may reimpress the character of personalty on chattel
which by annexation to the land, have become fixtures accord-
ing to the ordinary rale of law; provided only that they have
not been so incorporated as to lose their identity and the re-
conversion does not interfere with the rights of creditors or
third persons."
Finally we would thus suirimarize the law in this con-
noction: A mortgagee is entitled to all that was realty at
the time of the execution of a mortgage but as to subsequent
accessions he has no rights, if there exists between the par-
ties an agreement that a lien shall attach for their purchase
price; but such lien will be of no avail, whatever, if the
removal of" such accession would injure the freehold; and a
subsequent purchaier would of course, as regards this last
point, stand in the same position as the mortgagee.
19
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD TEST.
The first case of note in this state which deals with
the subject of fixtures is that of Walker v. Sherman (20 Wend.
686)' wherein Cowen, J., in rendering the opinion of the court
entered into an elaborate examination and discussAon of all
the old cases of importance. Though that litigation grew out
of a partition between tenants in common, the same principles
were applied as though the litigants had been vendor and venua
dee.
This case decided that certain machinery in a woolen
factory was personalty, because it was not annexed to the real-
ty. This decision entirely ignores a fact which was estab-A
lished in evidence and which should have caused an opposite
conclusion to be reached; this important fact was, that the
machinery in question had passed from one owner of the factory
to another, for eleven years. But the learned judge says:
"I admit that some of the cases are quite too strict against
the purchaser bt as far as I nave looked into them, and I have
examined a good many, both English and American, the.y are al-
most uniformly hostile to the idea of mere loose, movable ma-
chinery, even where it the main agent or principal thing in
prosecuting the business to which a freehold property is
20
adapted, being considered as part of that freehold for any
purpose. To make it a fixtute, itmust not only be essential
to the business of the erection, but it must attached to it
in some way." 'And he concludes his brilliantly logical and
equitable disquisition by saying: *The general importante of
the rule, however, which goes upon corporal annexation is so
great that more evil will result from frittering it away by
exceptions, than can arise from the hardship of adhering to
it in particular cases."-
It certainly does seem surprising that this learned
judge shonld have deemed it fitting to cling to a rule merely
for the sake of expediency, when a previous case had shown him
that the application of that identical rule might not only
lead to results that were inequitable and illogical; but that
it might also produce a state of affairs positivaly absurd. The
case referred to is that of Miller v. Plumb (6 Cowen 665),
where it was held that certain potash kettles actually attached
to the freehold were a part thereof, while certain other ket-
tles quite as necessary in he prosecution of the business
were held to be personalty because they merely stood in the
building without being in any way attached thereto.
During the twenty-five years immnediately succeeding the
21
case of Walker v. Sherman, there crept into the cases certain
dicta which could not be reconciled with its doctrine; for
example, it was suggested that "intention enters into and makes
an element of each case;" and it was further said, that the
"circumstances were to be taken into account to show whether
the erections were made for the permanent improvement of the
freehold or for the temporary purposes of trade."
Furthermore it became. apparent that the doctrine of
Walker v. Sherman was not being applied by the courts except
where it seemed that there was no escapjitg it; wherever it
was possible they avoided its corrosive influence and based
their decisions on the old cases.
In Bishop v. Bishop, (11 N. Y. 123) decided in 1854,
the plaintiff, as executrix, sold to the defendant certain hop
poles which were piled up on the farm and took his note. After.
ward the farm was sold under a mortgage while the poles were
still on the land. In an action on the note the defendant
set up that the poles were fixtures and that there was a con-
sequent failure of consideration; and the court so held; say-
ing: "The root of the hop is perennial, continuing for a
series of years. That the hop roots would pass to a purchaser
of the real estate, that can be no doubt. The hop pole is
22
indispensable to the cultivation of the crop, Etc., etc."
continuing the reasoning on the lines laid down in the old case
of Lawton v. Salmon, ante. Denio and Jonson JJ., dissented
on the ground that there snould be an actual annexation.
This decision plainly indicates the growing dissatis-
faction with the old rule requiring an actual annexation and
shows a disposition to view the matter more in the light of
equity and common sense. And in the next aase which came
before the court, it placed itself on record with reference
to this point in such a manner as to render exceedingly un*-
likely a future recurrence to that old fallacy as a final test.
The case was that of Snedeker v. Warring (12 N. Y. 170)
and the chief point at issue was whether a certain granite
statue, weighing three or four tons, but held in its place
merely by its own weight, should be considered a fixture. Held
that it should be so regarded. Parker, J., rendered the opin%-
ion, and in discussing the propriety of requiring an actual
annexation, remarks that, "it would be absurd to claim that
those colossal erections (the sphinxes) were still unadminis-
tered personal assets of the Ptolen-.es , merely because they
are held in place by their own weight." "I apprehend" he
continues, "the question whether the pyramids of Egypt or
Cleopatra's Needle are real or personal property does not
23
depend upon an inquiry by the antiquarian whether they were
originally made to adhere to their fo-andations with wafers,
or sealing-wax, or a handful of cement." It may be noted, in
passing, that this is the first case which appears in the
books wherein a similar litigation was carried on over a sta-
tue .
The next important case which demands our attention in
this connection is Potter v. Cromwell (40 N. Y. 292) amd is
valuable to us chiefly because it is the first case to state
in definite form the tests which are now applied in deter-
mining the status of a chattel when used in conjunction with
realty. For the criterion of a fixture therein set forth the
court is indebted to the case of Teaff v. Hewitt (1 McCook
(Ohio) 511).That criterion was accepted as satisfactory in
Vorhees v. McGinnis, ante, and again in McRea v. Bank; and,
in fact, none of the later cases appear inclined to cavil at
it or to depart from it in any way. This criterion requires
the union of three elements in a chattel, in order that it may
constitute a fixture:
(1) Permanency of annexation; (2) Adaptability; (3) Inten-.
tion of the parties.
It~is not necessary that there should be an actual annex
ation; mere juxtaposition will suffice, and the courts would
24
more clearly present their real meaning if they would use the
word "accession" in place of "annexation".
The intention of the party is the prime test, and the
first two elements, supra, are required merely as a means to
an end. That is, if the conditions present are such as to
indicate by inference an intent to make the chattel a permas
nent accession--and the adaptability of the chattel would be
one of the conditions to be considered--then no other evidende
need be forthcoming to make the article a fixture. And in
support of this view we adduce the following words of Rappallo
J., in McRea v. Bank (66 N. Y. 489): "The mode of annexation
may, it is true, in the absence of other proof of intent ,be
controlling."
Thus, the courts of this state, have lifted themselves
completely out of the depths into whicht hey were thrust by
the iniquitous doctrine promulgated in Walker v. Sherman, and
have advanced step by step up the precipitous Mountain of Re-
form; not blazoning forth their progress as each foot crept
noislessly past its mate, lest their intention be noted and
defeated by the intervention of that conscienceless enemy of
improvement, "Stare aecisis" ; but holding themselves none
the less firmly in each new position they g reasonS for
25
the hope that they may soon reach the summit. And when that
happy end is compassed they will have ceased to constitute
themselves judges, both of the law and" of the facts, and will
have made the question of fixtures one of fact alone for the
jury under instructions from the court which shall embody the
three elements, the presence of which they now deem to constia-
tute the proper test.

